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Large Capital Infusions, Investor Reactions, and the  




We examine investors’ reactions to announcements of large seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) by U.S. 
financial institutions (FIs) from 2000 to 2009. These offerings include market infusions as well as 
injections of government capital under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).  The sample period 
covers both business cycle expansions and contractions, and the recent financial crisis. We present 
evidence on the factors affecting FI decisions to issue capital, the determinants of investor reactions, and 
post-SEO performance of issuers as well as a sample of matching FIs.  We find that investors reacted 
negatively to the news of private market SEOs by FIs, both in the immediate term (e.g., the two days 
surrounding the announcement) and over the subsequent year, but positively to TARP injections.  
Reactions differed depending on the characteristics of the FIs, stage of the business cycle, and conditions 
of financial crisis.  Larger institutions were less likely to have raised capital through market offerings 
during the period prior to TARP, and firms receiving a TARP injection tended to be larger than other 
issuers.  We find that while TARP may have allowed FIs to increase their lending (as a share of assets) in 
the year after the issuance, they took on more credit risk to do so.  We find no evidence that banks’ capital 
adequacy increased after the capital injections.  
 
1
1.  Introduction 
 
   Proper functioning of a nation’s capital markets to efficiently raise and allocate capital is an 
integral part of a healthy and growing economy.  The importance of capital market dynamics was clearly 
demonstrated during the financial crisis of 2007-2009, one of the worst in U.S. history, when some 
markets stopped functioning and many of the largest financial institutions (FIs) around the world found 
themselves needing to raise a large amount of capital precisely when it was very difficult to do so.
1  To 
moderate the effects of this crisis, the U.S. government established the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP) to recapitalize undercapitalized FIs.  In addition, recent regulatory changes, including the Dodd-
Frank Act, Basel III, and changes to the European Union capital rules, all underscore the important role of 
capital at FIs.  Since a firm’s decision to raise additional capital can alter its cash flows, growth prospects, 
and risk-taking incentives, it is important to understand how investors react when FIs issue large amounts 
of equity capital via seasoned offerings through public capital markets or through non-market sources 
such as TARP. 
We use event study and panel regression methods to investigate the immediate and longer-term 
effects of the seasoned equity offering (SEO) announcements for a broader set of publicly traded FIs and 
for a more recent time period than has been investigated in the literature.  Our study is the first to 
investigate whether investor reactions to equity offerings are different over expansions and contractions 
of the business cycle and during the financial crisis compared to more normal economic conditions, and 
whether the reaction to U.S. government TARP injections is similar to that of market capital injections 
from investors. 
The literature suggests that firms can experience several advantages and disadvantages by raising 
capital via SEOs.  The announcement of an SEO can be viewed as positive news because the firm will 
then be able to use the funds to exploit new business opportunities and the market may perceive these 
                                                      
1 Vice Chair of the Federal Reserve Board Janet Yellen (2009) has suggested that “if anyone ever needed a 
demonstration on the strength of the links between the functioning of the financial system and the functioning of the 
economy, then this is it. …a genuine crisis in financial markets has generated a severe credit crunch.  The credit 
crunch in turn has left households and firms with fewer resources to finance spending, and as a result, output 
growth has weakened and unemployment has risen.”  
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opportunities as the reason for the issuance.  Moreover, the additional equity can bolster the issuing firm’s 
capital position (reduce its financial leverage) and thereby mollify regulators.  To the extent that investors 
value this reduction in risk and/or perceive that the FI will have stronger growth prospects, the firm’s 
stock price can react positively to the announcement of an SEO.  
On the negative side, Myers and Majluf (1984) were the first to note that there is an adverse 
selection problem associated with SEOs and, thus, SEO announcements can send a negative signal about 
the firm’s future prospects.  Specifically, when firm managers have positive inside information on their 
investment opportunities and are acting on behalf of the current shareholders, they may refrain from 
issuing new equity, preferring to use internal financing to fund investment in positive net present value 
projects because the new equity issues will be underpriced, as they will not reflect the managers’ private 
information about the good investment opportunities (this is the so-called under-investment problem).  
However, if the managers have negative inside information and the firm is overvalued, they will tend to 
issue new equity.  Similarly, bank regulators may have inside information based on bank examinations 
and surveillance.  Hence, if they force a bank to issue new capital, it would signal to the market that the 
bank is in distress.  In these scenarios, issuing equity could be interpreted as bad news (or less good news) 
compared with not issuing equity.  Thus, whether the advantages outweigh the disadvantages of issuing 
new equity is an important empirical question.   
Some earlier studies found negative investor reaction to SEOs.
2  We investigate whether this 
finding holds in our broader data set of SEOs and whether the signs of the reactions differ for TARP 
                                                      
2 Studies of investor reaction to SEOs by commercial banks have focused mainly on short-term announcement 
effects using small samples of firms and relatively brief time periods (typically fewer than 100 firms and fewer than 
10 years of data).  These studies usually find either negative or, at times, insignificant short-term abnormal returns in 
response to SEO announcements, with the magnitude of the effect varying based on the level of the bank’s capital 
adequacy (leverage), as well as whether the bank is a repetitive SEO issuer (see, e.g., Polonchek, et al., 1989; 
Keeley, 1989; Slovin, et al., 1991; and Cornett and Tehranian, 1994).  Slovin, et al. (1992) suggest that there are also 
negative contagion effects on rival commercial and investment banks when money center banks issue SEOs.  
Further, Slovin, et al., (1999) find a similar negative contagion effect when large banks cut or omit dividend 
payments.  More recently, Kim and Stock (2010) examine the effect of TARP preferred stock issuances on pre-
existing preferred stocks and find a positive short-term reaction.  Veronesi and Zingales (2009) estimate that TARP 
helped enhance the value of the three largest investment banks and Citigroup by reducing the likelihood of 
bankruptcy for these firms relative to other competitors such as J.P. Morgan Chase.  In addition, King (2010) uses 
credit default swap (CDS) spreads and shows that government support of 52 banks in six countries during the 2008  
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events vs. regular SEOs, during the financial crisis vs. more normal financial market conditions, or in 
recessions vs. expansions.  All else equal, receiving a government injection might be perceived as a 
negative signal if it was interpreted as a signal of financial distress and excessively diluted existing 
shareholders.  However, in a very poor economic environment in which investors expect many firms to 
fail, receiving government funding could be interpreted as positive news because it might be seen as a 
“vote of confidence” in the FI’s prospects by the government and/or as a sign that the firm was “too-big-
to-fail” and would receive a government-led rescue, if needed.  Thus, the reaction to TARP injections 
may be positive to the extent that the market views the injection as an indication of better prospects for 
the firm going forward.
3,4  The reaction to market injections might also differ during times of stress like 
the recent financial crisis than at other times because of the signal that risk-averse investors take from an 
announcement to raise capital at such a time.  Similarly, reactions might vary in recessions vs. 
expansions, especially if investors are risk-averse and their risk-aversion varies in tandem with economic 
conditions.  Along the same lines, investors’ reactions to a firm’s decision to issue a large amount of 
equity capital may be sensitive to firm characteristics.   
Our main findings are: (1) On average, investors reacted negatively to the news of market SEO 
announcements in the short term (i.e., in the two days surrounding the announcement) and over the 
subsequent year, but they reacted positively to the news of a TARP injection.  In terms of magnitude, the 
cumulative abnormal returns over days 0 and +1 for issuers were −57 to −60 basis points (bps) in non-
TARP events and +100 to +123 bps in TARP events.  For all issuers, the risk-adjusted excess return 
(measured by the alpha from a market model regression) was significantly lower, while the systematic 
risk (market beta) for TARP issuers was significantly higher in the year after injections than in the year 
                                                                                                                                                                           
crisis helped creditors at the expense of shareholders (because CDS spreads fell while bank stock prices briefly 
responded positively before continuing to decline in all countries except the U.S.).   
3 Ng, Vasvari, and Wittenberg-Moerman (2010) find evidence that healthier banks were selected to be participants 
in TARP’s Capital Purchase Program. 
4 In a different setting, Gasparro and Pagano (2010) find that another class of long-term investors, namely, sovereign 
wealth funds, can have important positive and negative effects on a firm’s equity value due to the potentially 
stabilizing and de-stabilizing effects of this unique type of long-term, quasi-government investment firm.  
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before.  Also, the increase in beta for all issuers is economically, as well as statistically, significant, 
representing an 85-basis-point rise in the average cost of equity capital after issuance (assuming a 5% 
equity risk premium).  We also find that issuers tended to have higher betas prior to issuance than non-
issuers of similar asset size (0.80 vs. 0.72) and that the gap widened subsequent to the issuance.  Issuers 
and non-issuers tend to have similar alphas before issuance, but the issuer’s alpha declined more sharply 
after the SEO.  TARP issuers tended to have lower alphas and higher betas both before and after issuance 
compared to the private SEO issuers.  Thus, TARP issuers were relatively riskier than other private 
issuers. 
(2) Investor reactions to the announcements of large SEOs are significantly related to certain 
characteristics of the issuing FI and the size of the issuance.  For non-TARP injections, the post-
announcement systematic risk (beta) is higher for larger, more profitable, and better capitalized issuers, 
especially during the recent financial crisis, and the post-announcement risk-adjusted excess return 
(alpha) is lower for less profitable issuers. 
(3) Investor reactions differ depending on the state of the business cycle and conditions of 
financial crisis.  During recessions, investors reacted positively to non-TARP capital infusions (as 
indicated by higher post-SEO alpha and lower post-SEO beta), possibly because being able to raise 
capital during weak economic conditions is viewed as a favorable signal by investors.  However, 
reactions during the crisis period were different.  In particular, equity offerings by FIs during the 2007-
2009 crisis were followed by significantly higher systematic risk, as measured by beta, for both non-
TARP and TARP infusions and by significantly lower risk-adjusted excess returns, as measured by alpha, 
for TARP recipients. 
(4) Factors that influence the decision to raise capital from the market are different from those 
found to influence government-initiated TARP injections.  Financial firms with a lower equity to asset 
ratio (higher leverage), smaller asset size, lower dividend payments (an indicator of being more cash-flow 
constrained), and nonbanks/thrifts were more likely to issue new non-TARP equity, perhaps because they 
were less able to use internal financing.  While more leveraged firms were also more likely to get a TARP  
 
5
injection than not to get one, these TARP issuers were relatively less leveraged than firms that issued 
private market SEOs over the sample period; TARP issuers also tended to be relatively larger in asset size 
and less cash-flow constrained compared to private market issuers.  The fact that larger firms and banks 
and thrifts were less likely to have issued private market equity may have necessitated TARP funding for 
these firms during the recent financial crisis.   
 (5) The post-SEO financial performance of the issuing FIs and their matching non-issuing firms 
is strongly related to their past performance, whether the capital injection was private or government-
based, and whether it occurred during the recent crisis or during a recession.  We find evidence that firms 
that raised capital either through a market issuance or via TARP had higher lending (as a share of assets) 
in the year after the issuance compared to the year before, and that their credit risk rose while their 
liquidity risk decreased after TARP issues.  Thus, while TARP may have enabled banks to increase 
lending, they appear to have accomplished this by lowering their credit standards (substituting riskier 
loans for safer loans), or by substituting loans for safer assets.  We find no evidence that banks’ capital 
adequacy increased after the capital injection.  
Taken together, our findings suggest that investor reactions to SEOs by U.S. FIs vary in a rational 
and systematic way in response to differences in economic and firm-specific conditions, as well as the 
type of investor (private market or government) that was involved in the offering.
5  These reactions have 
certain policy implications.  For example, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010 authorizes the Fed to issue countercyclical capital requirements for BHCs, which would 
strengthen capital requirements during expansions as part of macroprudential capital policies.  Our results 
suggest that investors react negatively to SEOs during good economic times (alpha decreases and beta 
increases in the year after issuance) and more positively to SEOs during recessions.  While these reactions 
                                                      
5 These findings are consistent with recent research that examines investors’ reactions to other financial choices 
during the financial crisis and over the business cycle.  For example, Gasparro and Pagano (2010) analyze how 
investors react to sovereign wealth fund investments in large FIs and report that investors respond differently 
depending on the source of the capital injections.  Also, Cangemi, et al. (2010) show how bond recovery rates vary 
in a systematic way over the business cycle since the debt renegotiation process between bondholders and 
shareholders can be interpreted as a real options problem.  
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may change in time as investors better understand the new regulatory regime, our results suggest that 
investors might misconstrue capital issuance during expansions as a negative signal of future economic 
prospects, thereby making the policy more costly to implement.   
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes our data, empirical questions 
and models.  Section 3 presents our empirical results, and Section 4 provides the conclusions. 
2. Data and model specification 
2.1 Data 
We combine data from SNL Financial, the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and 
Compustat, and after filtering for outliers, we obtain usable data on the announcements of 356 large SEOs 
of publicly traded FIs over 2000-2009.  These FIs include commercial banks, thrifts, securities, insurance, 
investment management, and other financial firms within SIC codes 6000-6799; 267 different FIs issued 
these offerings during the sample period.
6  Figure 1 shows the number of SEOs for each year of our 
sample, while Figure 2 displays the breakdown of these SEOs across the various SIC codes, with the 
majority of SEOs being issued by depository FIs (SIC codes 6000-6099).  We define large capital 
infusions as infusions greater than 10% of the firm’s existing common equity.  Of the 356 large SEOs, 
125 were TARP injections and 231 were offerings in the private capital market (which we will call non-
TARP issues).
7  For each issuing FI, we randomly match an FI that did not have an SEO of any size 
during the 500 trading days surrounding the announcement of the issuing firm’s capital infusion, and that 
                                                      
6 We focus on FIs because of their uniqueness as delegated monitors of borrowers, allocators of credit across major 
economic sectors, and administrators of the national payment system (Saunders and Cornett, 2008), and their 
contribution to the onset of the financial crisis due to potential spillovers of financial sector shocks to the rest of the 
economy.  We concentrate on SEOs, rather than initial public offering (IPOs), because we are interested in 
examining the impact of capital issuance from larger, more established financial firms, which exert disproportionate 
influences on the financial system as a whole.  The vast majority (77%) of FIs in our sample issued only one SEO 
during 2000-2009.  However, 61 FIs (23%) issued more than one SEO, with nearly two-thirds of these firms (67%) 
issuing just two SEOs during the period.  Thus, less than 8% of the FIs issued more than two SEOs. 
7 We treat the TARP investments as SEOs even though technically the FIs sold preferred stock to the U.S. 
government.  In our view it is appropriate to treat these TARP investments as SEOs because most investors, the 
general public, and the FIs themselves expected the government’s stakes to be repaid via future common stock sales 
to private investors and/or future retained earnings of the firms.  Thus, in effect, TARP investments can be viewed 
as “delayed seasoned common equity offerings,” where the U.S. government’s funds served as an intermediate step 
in this SEO process.    
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is similar in asset size (e.g., typically within 12% or $250 million of the issuer’s total assets) and is in the 
same 3-digit SIC code (or closest SIC code) as the issuing FI.  Thus, our sample has a total of 712 FIs. 
2.2 Empirical questions 
We investigate three major questions concerning capital injections: 
(1) How do investors react to large SEOs?  Do the reactions vary for TARP vs. non-TARP capital 
injections, with the characteristics of the issuer, with the stage of the business cycle and/or the recent 
financial crisis? 
(2) How is a firm’s decision to raise additional capital influenced by firm characteristics and does 
the impact of these characteristics differ for TARP vs. non-TARP injections or by stage of the business 
cycle?  
(3) Because ultimately, the regulatory question of whether FIs should hold more capital depends 
on whether holding capital affects firm performance, we ask: how does an issuing firm’s post-SEO 
performance differ relative to that of firms that did not receive a capital injection and does this post-SEO 
performance depend on firm characteristics? 
2.3 Empirical models  
To investigate investor reactions to a financial firm’s announcement of a large capital infusion, 
we estimate a Markowitz (1952) market model, which relates a firm’s stock return to the return on the 
market portfolio. The coefficient on the market portfolio (the market beta) is a reflection of investors’ 
perceptions of the firm’s systematic risk, while the model’s constant term, alpha, serves as a measure of 
the firm’s risk-adjusted “excess” performance.
8  The time-series model we estimate is:
  
,0 ,1 , ,0 ,,1 , ,, ,  () s ts s s ts m t s s t m t s t Event Event              (1) 
where, 
s,t  =  Return during day t on the s-th firm’s common stock, 
                                                      
8 Classic finance theory predicts that alpha should be zero (ex ante) but a firm’s decisions, such as the decision to 
issue equity capital, can cause alpha to deviate, positively or negatively, from zero (ex post).   
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m,t  =  Return during day t on the systematic risk factor, i.e., the “market” return (measured 
by the daily CRSP Value-weighted Total Return Index), 
Events,t  =  a dummy variable equal to 1 for all trading days from t−1 to t+250 that surround the 
s-th firm’s announcement of its seasoned capital injection on day t (and zero 
otherwise),  
0,s   =  alpha = the model’s intercept term (a measure of risk-adjusted daily performance), 
0,s  =  market beta = a measure of the s-th firm’s equity sensitivity to the systematic 
    “market” risk factor,  
1,s   =  change in alpha = intercept shift, a measure of change in the s-th firm’s alpha pre-
announcement to post-announcement related to Events,t,  
1,s   =  change in beta = slope shift, a measure of change in the s-th firm’s market beta pre-
announcement to post-announcement related to Events,t,  
 s,t   =  a zero-mean stochastic disturbance term.  
 
We estimate Eq. (1) using generalized method of moments (GMM) for each of the financial firms 
(issuers and non-issuers) using price data within a 500-day window (−250 to +250 trading days) 
surrounding the announcement date.  Standard errors of the estimated coefficients are adjusted for 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using the Newey and West (1987) method.  Thus, we estimate 712 
firm-specific time-series market models using GMM, which yields a firm-specific estimate of 0,s and 0,s 
for each firm s.
9   
                                                      
9 We expanded the model in Eq. (1) by including three more variables to create a Multi-Factor Augmented Fama-
French model where the three additional variables are Fama-French’s Small Minus Big (SMB), Fama-French’s High 
Minus Low (HML), and the Carhart momentum factor, Up Minus Down (UMD).  SMB and HML are based on the 
Fama-French value-weighted portfolios that are formed using size (market equity) and book-to-market value.  SMB 
is the average return on the three portfolios of small firms minus the average return on the three portfolios of large 
firms.  HML is the average return on the two portfolios of high book-to-market value firms minus the average return 
on the two portfolios of low book-to-market value firms.  The momentum factor, Up minus Down (UMD), is based 
on the Fama-French value-weighted portfolios formed on size and prior returns and is the average return on the three 
high prior return portfolios minus the average return on the three low prior return portfolios.  See 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/ pages/faculty/ken.french/ Data_Library/f-f_factors.html.  Estimating this alternative  
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We also use the individual parameter estimates for 1,s and 1,s for each firm from this model to 
calculate the averages of the changes in the model’s alpha and beta parameters pre- and post-
announcement.  That is, the estimates for 1,s and 1,s measure the change in an FI’s alpha and beta, 
respectively, during the t−1 to t+250 day post-announcement period associated with the SEO disclosures.  
If market participants view the capital infusion as a negative signal of lower return or increased risk, the 
post-announcement changes in alpha should be negative and changes in beta should be positive, on 
average.  Alternatively, if market participants view the capital injection as a positive signal because the 
firm is either exploiting profitable growth opportunities or has become better capitalized, then alpha 
values would rise and/or beta values would decline in magnitude.  We conduct tests of the difference in 
mean alphas and of mean betas across types of firms and issue (issuers vs. non-issuers for non-TARP and 
TARP issues). 
To investigate the impact of the FIs’ financial characteristics (proxied by ROA, EquityToAssets, 
Divpay, and Size) on investors’ reactions to capital injections, we regress the estimated individual firms’ 
alphas and betas after a capital infusion on these independent variables, as well as the relative size of the 
capital offering (OfferToEquity), a dummy variable that equals 1 if the FI is a depository institution, i.e., a 
commercial bank or thrift institution (Bankdum), and two time-related dummy variables (Recession and 
Crisis) that indicate whether the capital injection occurred when the economy was in recession and/or 
during the financial crisis of 2007-2009.  To investigate the factors that influence an FI’s decision to raise 
capital, for each type of capital injection (private market SEO and TARP infusion) we estimate a probit 
model in which the binary dependent variable (ys) equals 1 if the firm announces a large SEO, and zero 
for the matched non-issuing firms.  The model’s independent variables include both the firm 
characteristics and the time-related dummy variables.  In addition, to compare differences in the factors 
that influence issuing across type of issue, we estimate a probit model for the sample of issuers, where ys 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Fama-French model, we found alpha and beta estimates that are quite similar to those reported here for the simpler 
market model.  To conserve space, we present the event study results in Table 1 for both models but focus mainly on 
the market model for the remainder of the analysis.   
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equals 1 if the firm had a TARP infusion and 0 if the firm announced a private market SEO.  Our 
estimated models based on a panel data set are described by Eqs. (2)-(4): 
*
01 2 3 4 5
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 OA          
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   (4) 
where, 
α*s   =   post-announcement alpha estimate based on the results from Eq. (1)’s first-
stage regression.  It equals α0,s + α1,s from Eq. (1),   
β*s   =   post-announcement market beta estimate based on the results from Eq. (1)’s 
first-stage regression.  It equals β0,s + β1,s,  
ROAs =    the  s-th firm’s accounting return on assets for the calendar year prior to the 
capital injection (defined as net income divided by average book value of 
assets), 
EquityToAssetss =  the  s-th firm’s measure of capital adequacy or leverage (defined as the book 
value of common equity divided by total assets for the calendar year prior 
to the capital injection),  
Sizes   =  the natural log of the s-th firm’s year-end book value of assets for the 
calendar year prior to this capital issuance, 
DivPays   = the  s-th firm’s dividend payout ratio (defined as total common dividends 
paid divided by net income in the calendar year prior to this capital 
issuance), to proxy for the firm’s potential cash-flow constraints,    
Bankdums   =   a dummy variable equal to 1 if the s-th firm is a commercial bank or thrift 
institution, and zero otherwise,  
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OfferToEquitys   =  the s-th firm’s measure of the relative size of the capital injection (defined 
as the dollar value of the capital injection divided by the firm’s total 
shareholders equity for the calendar year prior to this capital issuance),
10 
Recessiont  =   a dummy variable equal to 1 if the capital injection occurred during a 
recession (as measured by the NBER business cycle dates), and zero 
otherwise.  In our sample, Recession = 1 from March 2001 through 
November 2001 and from December 2007 through June 2009, 
Crisist   =   a dummy variable equal to 1 if the capital injection occurred during the 
recent financial crisis, which we consider the period from April 2007 (the 
failure of subprime lender New Century Financial) to March 2009 (the 
beginning of the stock market rally), and zero otherwise, 
s, s, s   =  zero-mean stochastic disturbance terms. 
 
In Eqs. (2) – (4), we lag the firm-specific independent variables by one year to account for 
possible endogeneity and delayed effects, and estimate the models with industry fixed effects (dummy 
variables for the forty 4-digit SIC codes that represent sub-industries within the SIC financial services 
category).
11  We adjust the standard errors in the model for clustering by industry and year to account for 
any possible systematic variation in the model’s variables due to the passage of time and to differences 
across industries. 
By matching bank holding company data from the Y9-C report to our sample of SEOs, we were 
able to investigate the post-SEO financial performance of the bank holding companies in our sample.  We 
proxy performance with six different measures related to lending activity and risk, measured over the year 
                                                      
10
 Cornett and Tehranian (1994) suggest that the relative size of the offering might affect investor perceptions to the 
extent that larger offerings, relative to the FI’s existing capital, may cause greater dilution of existing shareholders 
and could also signal a more severe adverse selection problem.  We do not include this variable in the probit model 
because it is conditional on a firm’s decision to inject capital. 
11  Additional tests based on our model without these fixed effects show qualitatively similar, albeit statistically 
weaker, results.  Thus, to conserve space, we focus on the models that include the fixed effects.  
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following the SEO, and we regress each of these variables on independent variables, including the value 
of the dependent variable in the year prior to the SEO, firm characteristics, capital injection 
characteristics, and Recession and Crisis dummy variables.  Non-missing values of the variables allow us 
to include 98 SEOs in this analysis, with data on 104 issuers and 104 matched non-issuers.  We lag the 
firm-specific independent variables by one year prior to the SEO to account for possible endogeneity and 
delayed effects, and we adjust the standard errors in the model for clustering by year.
12   Thus, our 
regressions are of the form: 
,1 0 1 ,1 2 ,1
34 5
    
                                     
st st st
s tt s




   
       (5) 
where the six performance measures (Performance) we examine are: 
NLTA   =   total loans and leases, net of unearned income / total assets,    
NPLTL   =   credit risk as measured by non-performing loans / total loans and leases, net 
of unearned income,  
STNLTL  =   liquidity risk as measured by short-term non-core funding / total liabilities, 
where short-term non-core funding includes large time deposits with a 
maturity of one year or less, foreign deposits with a maturity of one year or 
less, federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreement to 
repurchase (RPs), commercial paper outstanding, borrowed money with a 
maturity of one year or less, and brokered deposits with a maturity of one 
year or less, 
OBSATA  =  off-balance-sheet activities / total assets, where off-balance-sheet activities 
include the notional amount of financial standby letters of credit, 
performance standby letters of credit, commercial and similar letters of 
credit, risk participations in bankers’ acceptances, securities lent, retained 
                                                      
12 Because these firms are in the same industry (banking), we do not include industry-specific fixed effects.  
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recourse on small business obligations, recourse and direct credit 
substitutes, all other financial assets sold with recourse, all other off-
balance-sheet liabilities, unused commitments with a maturity exceeding 
one year, and the credit equivalent amount of derivative contracts, as 
reported on Schedule HC-R of the Y9-C report,  
FGTA  =  interest rate risk as measured by short-term assets minus short-term 
liabilities to total assets, where short-term assets are cash and balances due 
from depository institutions, available-for-sale securities, federal funds sold 
and securities purchased under agreement to resell (reverse RPs), and short-
term liabilities are federal funds purchased and securities sold under 
agreement to repurchase (RPs), and  
EquityToAssets  =  a measure of capital adequacy, as defined above. 
The explanatory variables included in Eq. (5) are ROA, Size, DivPay, EquityToAssets (except 
when the performance measure is EquityToAssets), Recession, and Crisis, which are all defined above.  In 
addition, we include the following FI-specific variables, which are likely to be associated with our 
performance-related dependent variables:  
Cash  =  liquidity = cash + marketable securities / assets, 
Opaq  =  opacity to external investors = goodwill + intangible assets / total assets, 
Ohead  =  operational efficiency = total operating expenses / revenue, 
Volume  =  access to capital markets as measured by equity trading volume (in shares), 
TARPdum  =   a dummy variable equal to 1 if the FI received TARP funding or was 
matched to an FI that received TARP funding, and zero otherwise, 
Targetdum  =  a dummy variable equal to 1 if the FI had an SEO issuance (either TARP or 
non-TARP), and zero otherwise, 




3.  Empirical results 
3.1. Immediate-term announcement effects of large capital infusions: Event study results 
Estimates of Eq. (1) for non-TARP and TARP capital injections are reported in Table 1, panels A 
and B, respectively.
13  We find evidence that investors reacted negatively to the news of non-TARP 
SEOs, but positively to TARP injections.  In the non-TARP issues, issuing firms’ cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) are moderately negative (−56.6 bps) for the 2-day period corresponding to the 
announcement day and the subsequent day (t = 0 and t = +1) and are significant at the 10% level.
14  All 
other windows up to −10 to +10 days surrounding the event show insignificant effects for the issuing 
firms.  In theory, there can be competitive and/or contagion effects from the SEOs on the non-issuing 
firms. Competitive effects would lead to abnormal returns for the non-issuing firms in the opposite 
direction to those on the issuing firms, while contagion effects would be in the same direction.  Although 
such effects are observed in other studies, such as those performed by Slovin et al. (1992, 1999), we find 
no significant CARs here for any of the windows for the non-issuer firms, except day t−1.  This may have 
occurred either because of the lack of spillover effects or because the non-issuing firm sub-sample 
includes firms with both competitive and contagion effects, resulting in a zero overall effect.
15   
We find that the market distinguishes between TARP and non-TARP issuances both in terms of 
direction and magnitude of the effects.  Specifically, the CARs for the TARP injections for the issuing 
firms are positive, rather than negative, and they are larger in magnitude than for non-TARP injections, 
                                                      
13 As noted earlier, in this table we report results for the Fama-French (including momentum factor) model as well 
as the market model, but because the results are similar, in the text we discuss the results from the market model to 
save space. 
14 We use the adjusted t-statistic method of Kolari and Pynnonen (2010) to account for increased variance and non-
zero cross-correlation in a firm’s returns around the time of the announcement due to potential time-clustering of 
events.  This approach is shown to have greater statistical power compared to other tests when return variance and 
cross-correlations between firm’s returns increase simultaneously due to many firms experiencing an event at, or 
near, the same event date. 
15 Results based on the Fama-French model plus a momentum factor are generally consistent with those of the 
market model in terms of the direction and significance, though in some cases they are stronger in magnitude. 
Hence, our results are robust to the choice of different forms of the underlying return-generating process. There are 
two dissimilar findings, however, for issuers in the TARP injection cases. On day t−1 the effect is negative in the 
market model but insignificant in the Fama-French model, and on the event date, the effect is insignificant in the 
former and positive in the latter.   
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averaging +99.7 bps over the 2-day period  (t = 0 and t = +1) vs. −56.6 bps for non-TARP issues.  Again, 
all other windows up to −10 to +10 days surrounding the event are found to be insignificant for the firms 
receiving TARP injections, except for the day before the injection (t−1), which is negative.  For TARP 
events, the effect on the matched non-issuing firms is insignificant for all windows with two exceptions: 
the effect for the pre-announcement day is positive and the effect for the event day is negative.  The 
conflicting effect between TARP-related issuing and non-issuing firms on the event day and the day 
before indicates the presence of a competitive effect (rivalry), rather than a contagion effect. 
The lack of significance of the effects beyond the second day after the event indicates that the 
impact of the announcements was short-lived and was absorbed by the market rather rapidly.  In normal 
times, this is not surprising because equity markets tend to disseminate information quickly, being 
relatively efficient.  However, we also find that during the period of TARP injections the market seems to 
be effective in quickly incorporating information.  The issuing firms’ modestly negative immediate CARs 
and the positive effect from TARP funding reported in Table 1 suggest that investors react negatively to 
large market capital infusions and positively to TARP capital injections.  Thus, the reluctance of some FIs 
to take TARP funding seems to have been unfounded, at least in the near term over which we measure 
investor reactions. The findings based on the second-stage regressions that use the estimated post-
announcement alphas and betas of issuing and non-issuing firms, reported in Table 3 and discussed in the 
next section, also support this conclusion.  
As noted earlier, our results complement the findings in Gasparro and Pagano (2010), who report 
insignificant announcement effects for investment by sovereign wealth funds in 35 large North American 
FIs.  These authors suggest that the lack of significance of such capital injections is due to their 
counterbalancing influences, including, e.g., lower leverage and better monitoring vs. dilution and 
potentially negative signals.  In addition, Norden, et al. (2011) find that recent government interventions 
in the U.S. banking sector can also positively influence the corporations that borrow from these banks.  
For example, they find that borrowing firms’ stock returns were positively influenced by the TARP 
program, where the most pronounced effects are associated with smaller, riskier, and bank-dependent  
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firms.  Our results, taken together with the Gasparro-Pagano and Norden, et al. findings, indicate that the 
source of, and the economic environment surrounding, the SEO investment can be vitally important in 
determining the “net” announcement effect.   That is, when large, patient investors with “deep pockets,” 
such as the U.S. government or sovereign wealth funds, make a capital injection, the net effect can be 
positive for banks and their customers.  However, when the investors in an SEO are unable to commit 
additional resources in the future, the net effect is negative.  
3.2 Additional tests of the announcement effects 
 The summary statistics for the variables used in our regression analysis and the alpha and beta 
estimates based on the GMM estimation of the market model for the full sample of FIs (Eqs. (3) and (4)) 
are reported in Table 2, panels A and B.  In addition, panels C-D and E-F display the summary statistics 
for the non-TARP and TARP events, respectively.  Panel G compares characteristics of TARP issuers, 
private market SEO issuers, and all non-issuers (i.e., non-issuers matched with either a TARP issuer or a 
non-TARP issuer).  These statistics reveal that:   
(1) The average alpha of the issuers was similar to that of non-issuers but it declined more 
sharply after the event.  The average values of risk-adjusted returns in the pre-event period, α0, for the 
issuing and non-issuing firms reveal that prior to SEO announcements, the two groups had statistically 
similar risk-adjusted excess returns.  In particular, prior to the announcements, the alphas for the full 
sample of 356 target FIs averaged −0.50 bps and those of the matching firms averaged 1.6 bps, and the 
difference between the two was statistically insignificant.  But in the post-event period, the alphas are 
dissimilar.  Specifically, in the year following the SEO announcement, the issuing firms’ alpha was, on 
average, 7.2 bps lower compared to the period prior to the announcement, while the decline in the alpha 
for non-issuers was a much smaller 3.2 bps, and the difference between the two figures is significant at 
the 10% level.  Examining panels C-D and E-F of Table 2, we see that this significant difference appears 
to be driven by TARP events.  As shown in panel E, the alpha for TARP-related issuers decreased more 
sharply than for the full sample (−13.1 vs. −7.3 bps).  The larger decline in alpha for the issuers compared 
to non-issuers stands in contrast to the mean-reversion view of competitive markets for financial services.   
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This could indicate that our time period was too short for mean reversion to materialize or that the turmoil 
in financial markets over part of our sample period prevented mean reversion from occurring.  Also note, 
as shown in Panel G, TARP issuers had lower alphas than private market SEO issuers. 
(2) TARP issuers had greater market betas than non-issuers and private market SEO issuers, and 
the beta gap widened after the capitalization.  As shown in panels A and B in Table 2, the average beta 
values for issuers and non-issuers for the full sample are 0.80 and 0.72, respectively.  The difference 
between these averages is not statistically significant for the full sample, but this full sample result masks 
the significant differences in the betas of the TARP issuers relative to non-issuers (1.11 vs. 0.86).  This 
indicates that issuing firms under TARP were riskier prior to their capital injections, relative to their non-
issuing matched firms.  In other words, riskier firms chose to raise additional capital via TARP.  For the 
full sample and for TARP issuers, the issuing firms also witnessed a greater increase in their systematic 
risk in the subsequent year, so that the gap between the two groups’ betas widened in response to the SEO 
action.  Specifically, for the full sample, the beta of issuing firms rose by 0.17 (a 21% increase). while the 
beta of non-issuers rose by 0.11, or 15% (the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level).  This 
difference is economically significant.  Using a 5% equity risk premium, the average increase of 0.17 in 
the issuing FI’s beta translates into an 85-basis-point rise in the firm’s cost of equity. 
The rise in beta, again, appears to be driven by the TARP events: as shown in panels C and D, the 
average beta and change in beta values for issuing firms in non-TARP events were not significantly 
different from those of the non-issuers.  As shown in panels E and F, the average beta for TARP issuers 
rose by 0.295 (+27%), while non-issuers’ betas increased by 0.163 (+19%), with the difference between 
the two groups being significant at the 5% level.  The dissimilar change in betas of the two groups 
indicates that investors distinguished between firms that undertook capital injections and those that did 
not – TARP issuers were perceived as riskier than non-issuers in the post-event period.  The fact that the 
beta of non-issuers also rose (although by less) indicates that there was indeed some risk spillover (or  
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contagion) from the issuers to the non-issuers.
16,17  As reported in Panel G, TARP issuers were not only 
riskier than non-issuers, they were also riskier than firms that had announced market capital infusions. 
Note that the initial intention of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), 
which created TARP, was to improve the safety of the banking system by injecting new capital and by 
curtailing excessive risk-taking driven by incentive-based executive compensation in banks receiving 
government funding.  As a result of this program, a large number of FIs (both publicly and privately 
owned) received TARP funding, either voluntarily or involuntarily.  The provisions of EESA designed to 
curb excessive incentive-driven risk-taking by bank CEOs include the discontinuation of tax deductibility 
for performance-based pay over $1 million, as well as the requirement of special committees to review 
any executive compensation policies that may contain unduly large risk-inducing provisions.  Our results 
suggest that these provisions were not wholly successful or they were outweighed by the other incentives 
created by TARP funding.  Recall that another objective of TARP (although an implicit one) was to 
increase bank lending through the infusion of government funds to ease tight credit market conditions.  
This objective had the potential to conflict with the other objectives of EESA by inducing banks to take 
on loans with higher credit risk than they would otherwise have made.  Our result, discussed below and 
reported in Table 5, that TARP recipients and their matched non-issuers had higher credit risk in the year 
after the TARP injection, compared to a year before, is consistent with this potential conflict.  Our finding 
that TARP funding is associated with higher risk is broadly consistent with the main findings of Black 
and Hazelwood (2010), who focus on the narrower topic of the effects of TARP funding on the credit 
risk-taking behavior of the recipients and find that among the banks that received TARP funding, large 
                                                      
16 It is possible that not only has the riskiness of the target and matching firms increased as a result of large capital 
infusions but also the riskiness of the market index itself.  Our estimates are relative to the risk in the market.  
17 We also examined the distribution of the estimated changes in alpha and beta for the pooled sample of issuers and 
non-issuers.  The distribution of the estimates of the change in alpha is skewed to the left, indicating that in the post-
announcement period, a decline in risk-adjusted return is more frequent than an increase.  The distribution of the 
estimates of the change in beta is skewed to the right, indicating that in the post-announcement period, a rise in beta 
is more frequent than a decrease.  These results are consistent with those based on the mean of the distribution 
discussed in the text but are not included here in order to conserve space.  
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ones increased their credit risk, while smaller ones lowered their credit risk (relative to peers that did not 
receive TARP financing). 
 (3)  Other differences and similarities in firm characteristics.  According to the difference-in-
means tests for the full sample, reported in Table 2, Panels A and B, the issuer firms are similar to non-
issuers in terms of size (total assets and total market value of equity), ROE, operational efficiency 
(overhead expenses to revenue), and liquidity (cash plus marketable securities-to-total assets).  Relative to 
non-issuers, on average, issuing FIs had statistically significantly lower equity-to-assets (9.5% compared 
to 11.8% for non-issuers) and lower firm-wide profitability in terms of ROA (0.72% versus 1.06%).  
Also, the sub-sample of non-TARP issuers has a lower dividend payout ratio (19.2% compared to 29.2% 
for non-issuers), suggesting that these issuers were  not only less profitable and more highly levered but 
also more cash-flow-constrained than non-issuers.  All three of these factors can serve as driving forces 
behind the capitalization decision we examine in the next section.   Panel G’s comparison indicates that 
among firms issuing capital, those who received TARP injections were larger, less cash-flow constrained, 
less profitable, less liquid, and less efficient, and TARP injections tended to be smaller than other capital 
issuances. 
3.3 Investor reactions to capital infusions (panel-based tests) 
Table 3 presents the results of the panel regressions of the individual firms’ alphas and betas as 
specified in Eqs. (2) and (3).
18  Results in Panels A and B indicate that in non-TARP issuances, excess 
return performance (as measured by alpha) is greater for less profitable firms (ROA) and when the 
economy is in recession (including the recent financial crisis).  At first blush, this may seem 
counterintuitive; however, we are measuring performance relative to the market as a whole: firms able to 
issue new capital during a recession are relatively better off than other firms and thus their post-SEO 
                                                      
18 Based on the earlier results in Table 2 that show significant differences across sub-samples of the data set, we 
focus on this four-way split of the data (TARP vs. non-TARP and issuer vs. non-issuer) here.  In addition, we 
estimated the models in this section using a pooled sample rather than using this 4-way split and found that the 
parameter estimates and explanatory power of our models were significantly greater when we based the estimation 
on the sub-samples rather than the pooled data set.  Thus, to conserve space, we focus on the sub-sample results 
throughout the rest of the paper.  
 
20
performance is likely to be stronger than that of other market participants who are not able to raise capital 
during a weak economy.  For TARP-related FIs (both issuers and non-issuers), alpha is greater for smaller 
firms. 
Post-SEO announcement systematic risk (as measured by beta) for non-TARP events is higher for 
firms that are more profitable (ROA), more highly capitalized, and larger, and that issued capital during 
the crisis.  This may be because these firms have a greater capacity to absorb risk and may be the only 
ones able to raise new capital under crisis conditions.  Beta values are lower for larger equity issues 
(OfferToEquity) and when the issuance occurred during a non-crisis recession.
19  One explanation for the 
issue-size effect may be that FIs with lower betas can issue larger amounts of equity, i.e., there is reverse 
causality: it could be that lower-beta firms are more likely to attract larger amounts of capital from risk-
averse investors rather than it being that large issues lead to lower post-event risk (and therefore, lower 
betas).  For the non-issuing firms, too, firm size and the crisis period both have positive effects, while 
recession and increased dividend payments (signifying a lower cash-flow constraint) are negatively 
associated with beta.  Similar to non-TARP issues, the beta of TARP-related FIs is higher for larger 
financial firms.
20  The relationship we find between size and beta for both non-TARP and TARP issuers is 
consistent with that of Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999), who report that larger depository FIs 
typically have greater incentives to take on risk but are also more exposed to economy-wide systemic risk 
and, thus, are likely to assume greater systematic risk.  
3.4 Probit analysis of the decision to raise additional capital 
                                                      
19 The crisis variable measures the impact of the crisis over and above that of the recession.  The total effect is 
positive. 
20 While we control for Recession and Crisis in the TARP regressions, it should be noted that only 19 of the 125 
TARP issuances (15%) occurred outside of the crisis period.  Also, we checked to see if the original set of TARP 
injections to 9 major FIs (as reported in the Wall Street Journal on October 14, 2008) had a significant impact on 
our results by including a dummy variable equal to 1 for these specific SEO events in October 2008.  For both our 
alpha and beta second-stage regressions, this additional dummy variable is insignificant and does not alter the rest of 
our model’s key findings, although the results are not reported here to conserve space.  Thus, it does not seem to 
matter to investors whether the SEO event was a “forced” TARP infusion or a “necessary” TARP investment.  It 
should also be noted that we include in our second-stage regressions the FI’s dividend payout ratio (divpay), which 
proxies for an FI’s cash-flow constraints and thus is another way to control indirectly for the possibility that a TARP 
infusion might have been forced upon an FI.  
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Table 4 reports the estimation results for the probit models of the decision to raise capital.  As 
shown in Panels A and B, for both the TARP and non-TARP events, as might be expected, we find that 
firms with greater financial leverage (lower equity-to-assets ratio) were more likely to seek a large capital 
injection.  Indeed, this is the single most important determinant of a firm’s decision to issue equity during 
the TARP period.  For non-TARP issuers, we find that firms with tighter financial constraints (i.e., lower 
dividend payout ratios) also had a greater likelihood of raising additional external equity capital.   
Panel C compares the likelihood of receiving a TARP injection relative to the likelihood of 
receiving a market injection, among all issuers.  Here we see that TARP funding was more likely than 
non-TARP funding for banks and thrifts and larger institutions.  We also find that although for either type 
of issuer, issuers tended to be more leveraged than non-issuers, TARP issuers tended to have lower 
leverage than non-TARP issuers, all else equal.   
3.5 Post-SEO performance  
Table 5 reports the estimation results for the performance regressions described in Eq. (5) based 
on our sample of bank issuers and their matched non-issuing firms.  All six dependent variables are found 
to be strongly influenced by their lagged values, indicating that their changes are path dependent.  As 
shown in column 1, we find evidence that issuers raised the level of lending activity (as a ratio of assets) 
after a capital injection (significance at the 6% level), with TARP and non-TARP injections displaying 
similar effects.  The significant coefficient on the TARPdum variable in columns 2-3 indicate that credit 
risk rose, while liquidity risk fell, after TARP injections.
21  The significant coefficient on Crisis in 
columns 1-3 indicate that lending activity, credit risk, and liquidity risk all rose after capital issues during 
the financial crisis.  After controlling for the Crisis period and other relevant factors, we find no 
significant change in capital adequacy after TARP injections.  Taken together, our results suggest that the 
                                                      
21 The increase in lending and risk is similar to a finding in Deng, Elyasiani, and Mao (2010) that banks use 




TARP may have enabled recipients to increase lending but these banks may have lowered credit standards 
and/or shifted from lower risk assets to do so.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
This study investigates investors’ reactions in the immediate and longer term to the 
announcement of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) by financial institutions through private market 
transactions and TARP funding.  In particular, we examine how these reactions vary with characteristics 
of the firms, phases of the business cycle, and in response to financial crises such as the crisis of 2007-
2009.  In addition, we provide evidence on the determinants of the FIs’ decisions to issue additional 
equity capital, and the post-SEO financial performance of target firms and their matching firms. 
We find that: (1) Investors reacted negatively to the news of capital injections through private 
(non-TARP) funding both in the immediate term (i.e., the two days surrounding the announcement) and 
over the subsequent year, but positively for TARP injections.  The positive reaction to TARP funding 
might signal that investors took such funding as an indication that the receiving firms would be treated as 
“too-big-to-fail,” or that the funding would make them less likely to fail relative to firms that did not 
receive such funding.  Thus, the reluctance of some firms to take such funding seems to have been 
unfounded, at least in the near term over which we measure investor reactions.  It remains to be seen 
whether the longer-term effects are positive.  We also find that larger, banking-related firms were less 
likely to raise capital through non-TARP SEOs in our 2000-2009 sample period.  This reluctance may 
have made these types of firms more vulnerable when the financial crisis hit. 
(2) Investor reactions to capital injection news are significantly related to the FIs’ prior financial 
condition, including profitability, capitalization, and size.  For non-TARP injections, the post-
announcement systematic risk for issuers is higher for larger, more profitable, and better capitalized 
issuers, especially during the recent financial crisis.  In addition, post-announcement risk-adjusted excess 
return is lower for less profitable issuers.    
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(3) Several firm-specific and economy-wide factors are among the determinants of a firm’s 
decision to issue new capital.  For non-TARP offerings, these factors include the FIs’ equity 
capitalization, cash-flow constraints, asset size, and FI charter type (e.g., whether or not the FI is a bank 
or thrift institution).  For TARP injections, financial leverage plays a significant role.  Compared to non-
TARP SEO issuers, firms receiving TARP funding were larger, less cash-flow constrained, and less 
leveraged, all else equal. 
(4) Investor reactions to capital infusions vary with the stage of the business cycle, as well as 
whether or not the SEO occurred during the recent financial crisis.  For example, equity offerings by FIs 
during the 2007-2009 crisis were followed by significantly higher systematic risk for both non-TARP and 
TARP infusions.  In addition, the risk-adjusted excess returns for TARP recipients were significantly 
lower after receiving the TARP funds. 
(5) After TARP injections, credit risk rose, while liquidity risk dropped.  After capital injections 
during the financial crisis, lending activity, credit risk, and liquidity risk all increased.  We also found 
evidence that FIs increased their lending as a share of assets after both TARP and other SEO injections.  
Thus, our results suggest that TARP may have enabled banks to increase lending, but they may have 
taken on more credit risk while doing so. 
Overall, our analysis suggests that capital infusions in financial institutions can lead to varying 
investor reactions, even after controlling for firm-specific factors, due to the source of the funding (e.g., 
private vs. government), as well as changes in market-wide conditions related to business cycles and 
financial crises.  In addition, our initial evidence on how these capital infusions affect post-SEO financial 
performance suggests that TARP-related deals do not affect capital adequacy but are associated with 
increased lending and altered bank risk-taking behavior.  However, future research will be required to 
assess the long-term effects of these capital infusions on FI performance.  
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Figure 1.  Distribution of SEOs by Year 
 
This graph displays the number of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) issued each year during the sample 















Figure 2.  Distribution of SEOs by Industry 
This graph displays the number of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) by various types of financial 


























Number  Commercial Bks 






Cos.  Insurance 
Brokers 









2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 
25
Table 1. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
 
These CAR estimates for non-TARP and TARP events are based on the Markowitz (1952) model, 
Eq. (1), and a model based on the Fama-French factors plus a momentum factor (F-F + 
Momentum) for various time windows.  All models are estimated via generalized method of 
moments (GMM).  We use the adjusted t-statistic method of Kolari and Pynnonen (2010) to 
account for increased variance and non-zero cross-correlation in a firm’s returns due to potential 
time-clustering of events. 
 
 
Panel A.  Non-TARP Issuances 
 
 Issuing  Firms    Non-Issuing  Firms 
 
Window Market  Model  F-F + Momentum   Market  Model  F-F + Momentum 
 
−1 0.00039  0.00031   −0.00158*  −0.00155* 
0  −0.00244  −0.00268   0.00098  0.00096 
 −1, 0  −0.00205  −0.00237   −0.00060  −0.00059 
 0, +1  −0.00566*  −0.00598*   0.00146  0.00144 
 −1, +1  −0.00562  −0.00598   −0.00012  −0.00011 
 −5, +5  −0.00664  −0.00730   −0.00263  −0.00332 
 −10, +10  −0.00421  −0.00600   0.00121  0.00069 
          
*Significant at the 10% level and **significant at the 5% level, based on standard errors adjusted 
for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using the Newey and West (1987) method. 
 
 
Panel B.  TARP Injections 
 
 Issuing  Firms    Non-Issuing  Firms 
 
Window Market  Model  F-F + Momentum   Market  Model  F-F + Momentum 
 
−1  −0.00827*  −0.00649   0.00892** 0.01000** 
0    0.00569     0.00676*    −0.00830** −0.00749** 
 −1, 0   −0.00258   0.00027       0.00062  0.00251 
 0, +1      0.00997*       0.01233**       −0.00736  −0.00536 
 −1, +1    0.00170   0.00584       0.00156  0.00464 
 −5, +5   −0.00006   0.01750      −0.02111  −0.01021 
 −10, +10    0.00487   0.02510      −0.02580 0.00230 
          
*Significant at the 10% level and **significant at the 5% level, based on standard errors adjusted 





Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Difference-in-Means Tests 
 
 
This table reports the summary statistics for the main variables used in the empirical tests and some additional firm characteristics.  The 
first four variables reported below are used in the time series regressions described by Eq. (1), while the other variables are used in the 
cross-sectional analyses described by Eqs. (2)-(5) and reported in Tables 3-5.  Panel A displays statistics for firms that issue a large 
amount of equity capital (Issuing Firms), while Panel B shows similar statistics for Non-issuing Firms.  In Panel A, we report the 
results of difference-in-means tests by comparing the Issuing Firms’ average values to the Non-issuing Firms’ averages.  Statistically 
significant differences between the values in the two panels are denoted at various confidence levels as follows: * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 
1%. 
 
  Panel A.  All Issuing Firms  Panel B. All Non-issuing Firms 
Variable Description Mean    Std. 
Dev. 





in event study 
             
α0, Alpha  Eq. (1) constant  −0.00005  0.00210 356 0.00016   0.00198  356
α1  Change in alpha  −0.00072 * 0.00299 356 −0.00032 * 0.00289  356
β0, Beta  Eq. (1) slope  0.80413   0.73562 356 0.72228   0.68892  356
β1 Change  in  beta  0.16980 **  0.42067 356 0.10902 **  0.40526  356
Adj. R−squared  For Eq. (1) regressions  0.15266 *  0.17439 356 0.17574 *  0.19731  356
  
Variables used 
in Eqs. (2)-(5) 
(one-year lagged values) 
 
    
ROA  Return on assets  0.00719 **  0.01692 356 0.01060 **  0.01957 356
EquityToAssets Equity  / assets  0.09539 *** 0.05965 356 0.11772 ***  0.08248 356
Divpay  Dividend payout ratio  0.27378   0.61233 356 0.32778   0.37481 356
Size  Log of total assets  7.56136   1.63670 356 7.55146   1.91856 356
OfferToEquity  SEO amount / equity 39.62079   39.41973 356    
Recession  Business cycle dummy  0.44101  0.49721 356 0.44101   0.49721 356
Bankdum  Bank/thrift  dummy  0.78933  0.40836 356 0.78371   0.41230 356
ROE  Return on equity  0.07334   0.23020 351 0.10240   0.29383 342
Cash  Cash + marketable 
securities / assets 
 
0.06634  0.11312 356 0.05766   0.07049 356
Common Equity  Book value of equity  1137.05698 ** 3359.77289 346 2091.55821  ** 8238.06823 354
Opaq Goodwill+intangibles  / 
assets 
 
0.04129  0.11007 334 0.03370   0.09723 333
Mcap  Log of market value 
of equity 
5.474664  1.79419 350 5.52420   1.88159 326
Ohead  Total operating expenses / 
revenue 
 
0.70640  0.29108 352 0.68685   0.23336 356
Volume Trading  volume  (shares)  104,456,498.96  349,699,407.34 356 94,068,131.031   338,270,218.99 356
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   Panel C.  Non-TARP Issuing Firms  Panel D. Non-TARP Non-issuing Firms










in event study 
            
α0, Alpha  Eq. (1) constant  0.00055   0.00155 231 0.00051   0.00149  231
α1  Change in alpha  −0.00040   0.00221 231 −0.00009   0.00203  231
β0, Beta  Eq. (1) slope  0.63655   0.57897 231 0.64582   0.62493  231
β1 Change  in  beta  0.10198   0.38309 231 0.07992   0.40408  231
Adj. R-squared  For Eq. (1) regressions  0.1152 *  0.14382 231 0.14358 *  0.16808  231
  
Variables used 
in Eqs. (2)-(5) 
(one-year lagged values) 
 
    
ROA  Return on assets  0.00740 **  0.02031 231 0.01088 **  0.01730  231
EquityToAssets  Equity / assets  0.09581 *** 0.05774 231 0.10983 ***  0.05886  231
Divpay  Dividend payout ratio  0.19180 *** 0.34771 231 0.29922 ***  0.36085  231
Size  Log of total assets  7.38769   1.62685 231 7.50796   1.96181  231
OfferToEquity SEO  amount / equity  46.10390   47.17256 231   
Recession  Business cycle dummy  0.16883   0.37542 231 0.16883   0.37542  231
Bankdum Bank/thrift  dummy  0.70130   0.45868 231 0.69264   0.46240  231
ROE  Return on equity  0.08023   0.25614 231 0.11919   0.34471  231
Cash  Cash + marketable 




* 0.12054 231 0.06177  * 0.07797  231
Common Equity  Book value of equity  961.27576 **  2529.03378 231 1773.537 **  5675.18364  231





* 0.13444 213 0.02202  * 0.04544  211
Mcap  Log of market value 
of equity  5.45306 
 
1.83716 231 5.65808   2.05008  224





0.34894 228 0.66739   0.27055  231
Volume Trading  volume  (shares)  69,855,307.29   160,726,382.70 231 93,337,992.14   342,645,295.61  231 
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   Panel E.  TARP Issuing Firms    Panel F. TARP Non-issuing Firms 










in event study 
    
α0, Alpha  Eq. (1) constant  −0.00116 **  0.00251 125 −0.00050 **  0.00254 125
α1  Change in alpha  −0.00131   0.00401 125 −0.00073   0.00401 125
β0, Beta  Eq. (1) slope  1.11383 **  0.88231 125 0.86358 **  0.77677 125
β1 Change  in  beta  0.29514 **  0.45826 125 0.16279 **  0.40353 125
Adj. R-squared  For Eq. (1) regressions  0.22187   0.20312 125 0.23519   0.23144 125
  
Variables used 
in Eqs. (2)-(5) 
(one-year lagged values) 
 
    
ROA  Return on assets  0.00680   0.00735 125 0.01007    0.02326 125
EquityToAssets  Equity / assets  0.09463 *** 0.06327 125 0.13229  ***  0.11279 125
Divpay  Dividend payout ratio  0.42528   0.90195 125 0.38056    0.39541 125
Size  Log of total assets  7.88231   1.61244 125 7.63184    1.84097 125
OfferToEquity SEO  amount / equity  27.64000   9.91122 125    
Recession  Business cycle dummy  0.94400   0.23085 125 0.94400    0.23085 125
Bankdum Bank/thrift  dummy  0.95200   0.21463 125 0.95200    0.21463 125
ROE  Return on equity  0.06008   0.16964 120 0.06748    0.13179 111
Cash  Cash + marketable 




0.09490 125 0.05008 
 
0.05348 125
Common Equity  Book value of equity  1490.14797   4590.06140 115 2688.81678    11623.04241 123





0.04095 121 0.05391 
 
0.14734 122
Mcap  Log of market value 
of equity  5.51659 
 
1.71451 119 5.23018 
 
1.40915 102





0.11991 124 0.72280 
 
0.13465 125
Volume Trading  volume  (shares)  168,399,501.16   543,907,607.69 125 95,417,427.71   331,392,573.37 125 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Difference-in-Means Tests (continued) 
 
 
   
Panel G: Comparison of TARP Issuing Firms, Non-TARP Issuing Firms, and All Non-Issuing Firms 
     
 
   TARP Issuing 
Firms 
  Non-TARP 
Issuing Firms




Variable Description Mean    Mean    Mean   
 
Variables used 
in event study 
  
α0, Alpha  Eq. (1) constant  −0.00116 †††,‡‡‡ 0.00055 †††  0.00016  ‡ 
α1  Change in alpha  −0.00131 ††,‡‡  −0.00040 ††  −0.00032 ‡‡ 
β0, Beta  Eq. (1) slope  1.11383 †††,‡‡‡ 0.63655 †††  0.72228  ‡ 
β1 Change  in  beta  0.29514 †††,‡‡‡ 0.10198 †††  0.10902  ‡ 
Adj. R-squared  For Eq. (1) regressions  0.22187 †††,‡‡ 0.1152 †††  0.17574  ‡‡ 
  
Variables used 
in Eqs. (2)-(5) 
(one-year lagged values) 
 
      
ROA  Return on assets  0.00680 ‡‡‡  0.00740   0.0106 ‡‡‡
EquityToAssets  Equity / assets  0.09463 ‡‡‡  0.09581   0.11772 ‡‡‡
Divpay  Dividend payout ratio  0.42528 †††  0.19180 †††  0.32778  
Size  Log of total assets  7.88231 †††,‡  7.38769 †††  7.55146 ‡ 
OfferToEquity  SEO amount / equity  27.64000 †††  46.10390 †††    
Recession  Business cycle dummy  0.94400 †††,‡‡‡  0.16883 †††  0.44101 ‡‡‡
Bankdum Bank/thrift  dummy  0.95200  †††,‡‡‡  0.70130 †††  0.78933 ‡‡‡
ROE  Return on equity  0.06008 ‡  0.08023   0.1024 ‡ 
Cash  Cash + marketable 
securities / assets 
 
0.04548 †††  0.07763 †††  0.05766  
Common Equity  Book value of equity  1490.14797   961.27576   2091.558  
Opaq Goodwill+intangibles  / 
assets 
 
0.04404   0.03973   0.0337  
Mcap  Log of market value 
of equity 
5.51659   5.45306   5.52420  
Ohead  Total operating expenses / 
revenue 
 
0.74797 ††,‡‡‡  0.68379 ††  0.68685 ‡‡‡
Volume Trading  volume  (shares)  168,399,501.16 †† 69,855,307.29  ††  94,068,131.0
3 
 
         
  † TARP Issuing Firms significantly different from Non-TARP Issuing Firms at the 10% level 
  †† TARP Issuing Firms significantly different from Non-TARP Issuing Firms at the 5% level 
††† TARP Issuing Firms significantly different from Non-TARP Issuing Firms at the 1% level 
    
‡ TARP Issuing Firms significantly different from All Non-Issuing Firms at the 10% level 
  ‡‡ TARP Issuing Firms significantly different from All Non-Issuing Firms at the 5% level 




Table 3. Second-Stage Panel Regression Analysis Based on Capital Issuance 
 
Eqs. (2) and (3) panel regressions for firms issuing large capital offerings (10% or more of existing common equity) and 
matched firms that did not issue equity.  Standard errors are clustered by both year and SIC industry code.  Statistically 
significant differences are denoted at various confidence levels as follows: * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%. 
 
  Panel A. Non-TARP events: Issuers    Panel B. Non-TARP events: Non-Issuers 
Dependent Var.  α*  β*  α*  β* 
Independent Var.  Parameter  t-stat.  Parameter  t-stat.   Parameter  t-stat.  Parameter  t-stat. 
                 
Intercept 0.000731  0.62  −0.91215***  −3.62   −0.00076  −0.77  −0.19267  −0.60 
ROA  −0.01064***  −14.21 3.368662*** 2.61   0.000491  0.15 2.032099  1.10 
EquityToAssets  −0.00101  −0.28 1.981259*** 3.19   0.002752** 2.47  −0.34241  −0.38 
OfferToEquity  −1.710
−6  −0.57  −0.00105**  −2.53          
Size  −6.810
−5  −0.49 0.22083***  6.96    −2.610
−6  −0.03 0.168427*** 5.66 
Divpay  −0.00027  −0.51  −0.08808  −0.75   0.000334  0.92  −0.21361*  −1.90 
Bankdum  −0.00047  −0.90 0.058459  0.34   0.001166  0.94 0.179298  0.73 
Recession 0.00111**  2.10  −0.17466**  −2.56   0.000678**  2.41  −0.23729**  −2.10 
Crisis 0.000265  0.43  0.385921***  2.89    0.001101***  3.21  0.664506***  3.18 
                  
Fixed Effects?  Yes    Yes      Yes    Yes   
                  
No. Obs.  231    231      231    231   
                  
Adjusted R
2 0.1175    0.6170      0.0703    0.5181   
                 
                 
  Panel C. TARP events: Issuers   Panel D. TARP events: Non-Issuers
Dependent Var.  α*  β*    α*  β* 
Independent Var.  Parameter  t-stat.  Parameter  t-stat.   Parameter  t-stat.  Parameter  t-stat. 
                  
Intercept  0.00917***   29.25   −3.1598***  −4.03     0.01128***   6.33   −3.114701**  −2.13  
ROA  −0.000010   −0.01   −9.016437   −0.74     0.012137   0.28   −19.861427 *  −1.90  
EquityToAssets  0.000417   0.17   0.476889   1.35     −0.00814*   −1.72   1.843872 *  2.03  
OfferToEquity  0.000033   1.46   −0.003663   −0.53          
Size  −0.00065***  −9.71   0.42786*** 7.96      −0.00070***  −43.14   0.345825*** 3.06   
Divpay  0.000071   0.24   −0.027714   −0.34     0.000277   0.24   0.155882   0.80  
Bankdum  0.000522   1.29   −0.395777 **  −2.19     −0.003247   −0.95   1.834017*** 4.45   
Recession  −0.00149***  −4.07   0.000175   0.00     −0.001465   −1.23   −0.031308   −0.06  
Crisis  −0.00150***  −6.19   0.493796*** 4.69     0.000963** 2.18    −0.009598   −0.03  
                  
Fixed Effects?  Yes    Yes      Yes    Yes   
                  
No. Obs.  125    125      125    125   
                  
Adjusted R
2 0.2635    0.5413     0.1207    0.4239   
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Table 4. Probit Model of the Likelihood That a Firm Receives a Large Capital Infusion 
 
Results of probit model Eq. (4) where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the firm issued a large SEO (i.e., a 
seasoned equity offering totaling 10% or more of the firm’s prior year’s common equity).  Panel A reports the results 
for market issues and Panel B reports the results for TARP infusions, where the comparison group is matched non-
issuers.  Panel C reports the results for TARP infusions, where the comparison group is non-TARP issuer and Panel D 
reports the results for TARP infusions, where the comparison group is all non-issuers.  All independent variables are 
described in Table 2.  Statistically significant parameter estimates are denoted at various confidence levels as follows: * 
10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%. 
 
  Panel A.  Non-TARP Issues   
 
Panel B. TARP Infusions 
Parameter Estimate S.E. 
Chi 
Square p-value   Estimate S.E. 
Chi 
Square p-value 
Intercept   1.3395***  0.4468  8.99  0.0027    0.5062 0.7673  0.44  0.5094 
ROA  −1.8926 3.484 0.30  0.5870    −0.8602  7.7032 0.01 0.9111 
EquityToAssets  −3.7288*** 1.2855  8.41  0.0037   −3.502***  1.2066 8.42 0.0037 
Size  −0.0737* 0.0394 3.49 0.0616    0.0137 0.0505  0.07  0.7865 
Divpay  −0.4699*** 0.1723  7.44  0.0064   0.0706 0.1300  0.30  0.5868 
Bankdum  −0.3986** 0.1749  5.19  0.0227    −0.3456  0.4661 0.55 0.4584 
Recession  −0.0385 0.1874  0.04  0.8374    0.3186 0.4607  0.48  0.4892 
Crisis   0.1027  0.2310  0.20  0.6566    −0.2513  0.3281 0.59 0.4436 
                  




Panel C.  TARP Infusions conditional on 
Issuing   
 
Panel D. TARP Infusions compared to Not 
Issuing 
Parameter Estimate S.E. 
Chi 
Square p-value   Estimate S.E. 
Chi 
Square p-value 
Intercept  −4.8032*** 0.8162  34.63  <0.0001   −2.4344*** 0.5181  22.08  <0.0001 
ROA  1.5794 10.234  0.02 0.8773    -0.9622 5.5252  0.03  0.8618 
EquityToAssets  5.3125** 2.9968  3.14  0.0763    −2.8114** 1.1760  5.72  0.0168 
Size  0.1141* 0.0686 2.77  0.0963    0.0558 0.0417  1.79  0.1809 
Divpay  0.8777*** 0.2723  10.39  0.0013   0.0689 0.1235  0.31  0.5771 
Bankdum  1.5520*** 0.3369  21.23  <0.0001   0.5307* 0.2862  3.44  0.0637 
Recession  1.7670*** 0.2898  37.18  <0.0001   1.3298*** 0.2691  24.42  <0.0001 
Crisis  1.1476*** 0.2634  18.97  <0.0001   0.3402 0.2272  2.24  0.1343 
                  





Table 5. Post-SEO Financial Performance of Bank Issuers and Their Matched Non-issuer Firms 
Panel regressions where post-SEO financial performance is proxied by the bank’s lending activity (NLTA), credit risk (NPLTLL), liquidity risk 
(STNLTL), capital adequacy (EquityToAssets), off-balance-sheet activities (OBSATA), and interest rate risk (FGTA).  Each dependent variable 
measures the level of the relevant performance metric for the year following the SEO issuance.  The independent variables measuring bank 
characteristics are measured for the year prior to the SEO.  Lagged Dep. Var. represents the dependent variable’s value for the year prior to the 
SEO issuance.  TARPdum is a dummy variable set to 1 if the FI received TARP funding or was matched to an FI that received such funding.  
Targetdum is a dummy variable set to 1 if the FI had an SEO issuance (i.e., either a TARP or non-TARP capital infusion).  TargetdumTARPdum 
is an interaction term that isolates the effects on TARP issuers within the sample.  Year-clustered standard errors are used to evaluate statistical 
significance at the * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% levels. 
 













Interest Rate Risk 
(FGTA)
 
Independent Var. Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value 
Intercept  0.0816* 0.0553  −0.0073   0.2335 0.0024    0.9371 0.0206***  0.0095  −0.0149***  0.0016 0.0131    0.5636 
Lagged Dep. Var.  0.9399***   <.0001  1.014***  <.0001  0.932***  <.0001  0.8979*** <.0001 0.8444*** <.0001 0.7894***  <.0001 
TARPdum  −0.0052   0.2284 0.006***  0.0022  −0.0193**  0.0408  −0.0036   0.1327  0.0016   0.3268  0.0042   0.4048 
Targetdum  0.0085 *  0.0578  0.0008   0.7040  −0.0094   0.3360 0.0009   0.7654  −0.0008   0.8545 0.0051    0.4180 
(TARPdum 
Targetdum) 
0.0031   0.5711  −0.0013   0.3908  0.0147   0.1490  0.0032   0.4937  0.0016   0.6085  −0.0097*   0.1023 
Recession  0.0126   0.1718  −0.009***  0.0025 0.016***  0.0034  0.0015    0.7362 0.0111*** 0.0054  −0.0015   0.8306 
Crisis  0.0224 **  0.0172  0.011***  0.0006  0.0231**  0.0300  −0.0080   0.3063  −0.0029   0.5078  −0.0095   0.4302 
ROA  0.6344   0.2955  −0.1704**  0.0248 1.2616**  0.0140  0.4310** 0.0249 0.0957    0.5290  −0.5816*  0.0708 
EquityToAssets  −0.1426   0.2847 0.0328   0.1831  −0.3307*  0.0884  −0.0400   0.1294  −0.0299   0.7893 
Size  −0.0020   0.3784 0.0009*  0.0691  0.0014    0.4469  −0.0008   0.1380 0.0019*** 0.0035  −0.0028   0.1090 
Divpay  −0.0043**   0.0165  −0.0010**  0.0157  −0.005***  0.0027 0.0017* 0.0608  −0.0014   0.1920 0.0015    0.3227 
Cash  −0.1430*   0.0337  −0.0027   0.6920 0.0001    0.9986 −0.0318*  0.0797 0.0048    0.7343 0.2666***  0.0009 
Opaq  −0.0124   0.7573 0.0029   0.8841  −0.0390   0.7183 0.072***  0.0025  −0.0236   0.2148 0.0444    0.3706 
Ohead  −0.0201   0.1802 0.0044**  0.0322 0.046** 0.0491  0.0054   0.1401  0.0052   0.4018  −0.0055   0.6371 
Volume  0.0000   0.7452  0.0000   0.6279  0.0000   0.7986  0.0000   0.9489  0.0000*  0.0970  0.0000   0.8759 
OfferToEquity  0.000019   0.8628  −0.00002   0.3842  0.00012   0.4790  −0.00009**  0.0289 0.00053    0.5104  −0.0001   0.7203 
                     
No. obs.  208    208    208  208    196   206  
Adjusted R





Berger, A.N., Demsetz, R.S., and Strahan, P.E., 1999. The consolidation of the financial services 
industry: Causes, consequences, and implications for the future, Journal of Banking and Finance 
23, 135−194. 
 
Black, Lamont, and Hazelwood, Lieu, 2010. The effect of TARP on bank risk-taking, Working Paper, 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors. 
 
Cangemi, Robert R., Mason, Joseph R., and  Pagano, Michael S., 2010. Using an option-based 
structural model to estimated defaulted bond recovery rates,  Working Paper, Louisiana State 
University. 
 
Cornett, Marcia Millon, and Tehranian, Hassan, 1994. An examination of voluntary versus 
involuntary security issuances by commercial banks: The impact of capital regulations on 
common stock returns,  Journal of Financial Economics 35(1), 99−122.  
 
Deng, Saying, Elyasiani, Elyas, and Mao, Connie, 2010. Bank holding company derivatives usage, 
cost of debt and lending patterns,  Manuscript presented at the Financial Management Association 
Annual Meeting, New York. 
 
Gasparro, Vincent, and Pagano, Michael S., 2010. Sovereign wealth funds: An early look at their 
impact on debt and equity markets during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, Financial Analysts 
Journal 66 (3), 92-103. 
 
Kim, D.H., and Stock, D., 2010. The effects of TARP preferred stock issuance on existing preferred 
stocks, Working Paper, University of Oklahoma. 
 
King, M.R., 2010. Time to buy or just buying time? The market reaction to bank rescue packages, 
Working Paper No. 288, Bank for International Settlements, Basel. 
 
Keeley, M., 1989. The stock price effects of bank holding company securities issuance. Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review 1, 3−19.  
 
Kolari, James W., and Pynnonen, Seppo, 2010. Event study testing with cross-sectional correlation of 
abnormal returns, Review of Financial Studies 23(11), 3996−4025.  
 
Markowitz, H., 1952. Portfolio selection, Journal of Finance 7, 77−91. 
 
Myers, S., and Majluf, N., 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have 
information that investors do not have, Journal of Financial Economics 16, 187−221. 
 
Newey, W.,West, K., 1987. A simple positive semi-definite, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 




Ng, Jeffrey, Vasvari, Florin P. and Wittenberg−Moerman,  Regina, 2010. Were healthy banks chosen 
in the TARP captial purchase program? University of Chicago manuscript. 
 
Norden, L., Roosenboom, P., and Wang, T., 2011. The impact of government intervention in banks on 
corporate borrowers’ stock returns, Rotterdam School of Management manuscript, Erasmus 
University. 
 
Polonchek, John, Slovin, Myron B., and Sushka, Marie E., 1989. Valuation effects of commercial 
bank securities offerings: A test of the information hypothesis, Journal of Banking & Finance 
13(3), 443−461. 
 
Saunders, Anthony, and Cornett, Marcia Millon, 2008. Financial Institutions Management: A Risk 
Management Approach, 6
th edition, McGraw Hill, New York. 
 
Slovin, Myron B., Sushka, Marie E., and Polonchek, John A., 1991. The information content of 
multiple seasoned common stock offerings by bank holding companies, Journal of Banking & 
Finance 15(3), 633−646.  
 
Slovin, Myron B., Sushka, Marie E., and Polonchek, John A., 1992. Informational externalities of 
seasoned equity issues: differences between banks and industrial firms, Journal of Financial 
Economics 32(1), 87−101. 
 
Slovin, M., Sushka, M., and Polonchek, J., 1999. An analysis of contagion and competitive effects at 
commercial banks, Journal of Financial Economics, 197−225. 
 
Veronesi, P., and Zingales, L., 2009. Paulson’s gift, NBER Working Paper No. 15458, Cambridge, 
MA. 
 
Yellen, Janet, 2009. The mortgage meltdown, financial markets, and the economy. The B.E. Journal 
of Economic Analysis and Policy 9(3) (Symposium) Article 3. 
 